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The History and Issues of Nuclear Extended Deterrence : The Case of U.S. Extended Deterrence in Euro | |
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This paper analyzes the challenges and debates surrounding the credibility of the United States' extended deterrence, using NATO as a case study. For this purpose, it examines the U.S. extended deterrence strategy towards Europe and the concerns and demands of NATO allies. Despite clear differences between NATO's extended deterrence in Europe and the ROK-US alliance facing North Korea's nuclear threats, the issues and lessons from the U.S. alliance consultation provide insights for future directions and tasks. Over its 75 year history, NATO has coordinated the diverse national interests and policies of its 32 member countries to deter the threat from the Soviet Union (now Russia). Both the deployed tactical nuclear weapons and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) promise U.S. automatic intervention and provide deterrence and assurance to allies. However, NATO faces several challenges,including asymmetry in threat perception, differing views on the role of nuclear weapons, varying policy preferences and priorities, dilemmas between deterrence and assurance, and the integration of nuclear and conventional forces. South Korea nevertheless needs to draw lessons from NATO's experience to enhance the credibility and integrated effectiveness of U.S. extended deterrence. The paper suggests that after establishing the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), efforts should focus on clear declaratory policies, strategic integration, a comprehensive crisis management system, joint reviews of nuclear deterrence postures, and nuclear planning at the military level. |